Friday, April 10, 2009
Israel Possesses No Security Solution without the Golan Heights
A synopsis of former National Security Chairman Maj.-Gen. (res.) Giora Eiland's analysis of security solutions in the north was recently prepared by Dr. Aaron Lerner of Independent Media Review Analysis (IMRA). The synopsis concludes that Israel possesses no security solution without retention of the Golan Heights:
Israel National News extracts 3 additional security problems from Eiland's report:
General Eiland's analysis of the necessity for retention of the Golan Heights to insure Israel's security was prepared for The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. To view the full analysis, click here.
The purpose of this analysis is to demonstrate that Israel does not possess a plausible solution to its security needs without the Golan Heights. Not only was the "solution" proposed in the year 2000 implausible at the time, but changing circumstances, both strategic and operative, have rendered Israel's forfeiture of the Golan today an even more reckless act.
This analysis is composed of seven sections:Geography and History of the Golan Heights
- A Peace Agreement with Syria - Truth and Illusion
- Israel's Current Security Concept
- The Importance of Strategic Depth
- Security Arrangements Discussed in 1999-2000
- Changed Circumstances Since 2000
- Diplomatic and Military Implications of a Golan Withdrawal
To sum up, the present border line is the only one affording plausible
defense for the State of Israel. It creates strategic depth, albeit minimal, and, in addition, this line exerts eastward control deep into Syrian territory. Any movement westward by Israel would create a considerable depreciation of Israel's defensive capability, owing to the nature of the terrain that descends from east to west.
When the issue of a possible Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights was raised in the 1990s, the first question discussed by the Israeli defense establishment was: Can Israel begin its defensive battle in the Hula Valley? The answer was negative. There was a unanimity backed by the political echelon, led by Prime Minister Ehud Barak, that in order to defend itself, Israel had to begin its defensive battle at the line where it was presently stationed.
How could this conclusion be reconciled with the understanding that a peace agreement with Syria mandated a concession of the entire Golan Heights? The response was based on security arrangements that were intended to bridge the gap between conceding the Golan and creating a situation that would guarantee that in case of war, IDF forces could return to the place where they are currently stationed. This was an attempt to "do without but feel satiated."
The security arrangements proposed in the 1990s was flawed in a number of ways. First, it relied on five dangerous assumptions... Second, it addressed the single threat posed by mechanized Syrian divisions, while ignoring other threats whose gravity is increasing. There is no guarantee that the interpretation will be accurate. History provides countless examples of situations where an enemy action was correctly identified by intelligence, but the attacked side did not undertake the proper reaction because it granted a lenient interpretation to enemy activity. The most relevant example is from the Yom Kippur War.
...In other words, in return for the danger and the weakness that will
result from conceding the Golan Heights, Israel will not be fully or even partially compensated with an improvement in its other capabilities.
Israel National News extracts 3 additional security problems from Eiland's report:
1. The increased effectiveness of advanced anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.
2. The expected urbanization of the Golan Heights, including many “policemen” who can be expected, together with many other “civilians,” to operate thousands of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles that will be stored in those cities, thus impeding the advancement of Israeli forces.
3. The Syrian strategic threat. More than Syrian ground forces, the major Syrian threat involves ground-to-ground missiles and large quantities of chemical weapons. In the discussions that took place in 1999-2000, no attempt was made to reduce the presence of these two capabilities.
General Eiland's analysis of the necessity for retention of the Golan Heights to insure Israel's security was prepared for The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. To view the full analysis, click here.
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Kremlin to Supply PA With New Weapons
On top of military training, equipment and aid which the Palestinian Authority is receiving from various other sources including the U.S. and Israel, the Jerusalem Post reports that Russia has now promised to supply military weapons, as well as vehicles and ammunition to the PA:
The obvious questions to be asked: For what, exactly, does the disfunctional PA need armored vehicles, helicopters and (yet another) 5,000 assault rifles? Or better yet, will those weapons not be turned against Israel, as the PA's weapons have in the past? And even if one assumes that the PA are the "good guys" (we don't), isn't there a strong possibility that those weapons will one day wind up in the hands of Hamas, as happened in Gaza?
Moscow has promised to supply the Palestinian Authority security forces in the West Bank with new weapons, including two helicopters.
The Russians have also agreed to supply the PA with more than 5,000 AK-47 assault rifles, 300 armored vehicles, 100 pistols and large quantities of ammunition, a senior PA official in Ramallah told The Jerusalem Post on Tuesday.
The obvious questions to be asked: For what, exactly, does the disfunctional PA need armored vehicles, helicopters and (yet another) 5,000 assault rifles? Or better yet, will those weapons not be turned against Israel, as the PA's weapons have in the past? And even if one assumes that the PA are the "good guys" (we don't), isn't there a strong possibility that those weapons will one day wind up in the hands of Hamas, as happened in Gaza?
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