IRAN*

DOES IRAN HAVE THE MEANS TO BLOW UP TEL AVIV? BASED ON IRANIAN THREATS ONE CAN ONLY ASSUME THAT ISRAEL'S MOST POPULACE CITY AND EVERY OTHER PLACE IN ISRAEL IS UNDER THE GUN OF IRAN AND ITS PROXIES.

ISRAEL IS IN NO STRATEGIC POSITION TO WAGE A DEFENSIVE WAR WITH IRAN. FURTHER, ISRAEL MAY NOT HAVE THE WHEREWITHAL TO DEFEND ITS POPULATION CENTERS AGAINST OVER 40,000 ROCKETS PLUS ICBM'S. IN ADDITION, ISRAEL MAY NOT HAVE THE ABILITY TO SUCCESSFULLY DESTROY IRAN'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES TOGETHER WITH THEIR AIR DEFENSES PLUS DESTROY IRAN'S CAPABILITIES FOR FURTHER AGGRESSION. THEREFORE, ISRAEL'S CHOICE MUST BE TO DESTROY THE IRAN NATION BY NUCLEAR FIRE.

UNLESS THE USA IS PREPARED TO DE-FANG THE IRANIANS ISRAEL HAS NO CHOICE. WASHINGTON WILL BE THE ONE TO DECIDE THE FATE OF THE MIDDLE EAST. AS PRESENTLY COMPOSED WASHINGTON IS MORE FRIENDLY TO THE ENEMIES OF ISRAEL THAN TO ISRAEL. PRAY THAT THE USA MAKES NO MORE MISTAKES IN THIS MATTER AND PROTECTS ITS INTERESTS BY SIDING WITH A FELLOW DEMOCRACY INSTEAD OF WITH THOSE WHO PREACH HATE AND WHO PREFER TO DIE IN THEIR HATRED THAN TO LIVE WITH ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE.
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Iran to 'Blow Up the Heart of Israel' if Attacked

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By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Published: October 9, 2009

TEHRAN, Iran (AP) -- Iran will ''blow up the heart of Israel'' if the United States or the Jewish state attacked it first, a top official with Iran's most powerful military force -- the Revolutionary Guard -- warned Friday.

Cleric Mojtaba Zolnour, who is the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's representative in the Guard, said that if a U.S. or Israeli missile lands in Iran, Iranian missiles will hit Israel in retaliation.

''Should a single American or Zionist missile land in our country, before the dust settles, Iranian missiles will blow up the heart of Israel,'' Zolnour was quoted as saying by the state IRNA news agency.

Iran and Israel are archenemies and anti-Israeli stance is a trademark for the hardline Guard. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has since 2005 often called for Israel's destruction and predicted demise for the Jewish state.

Though common, Zolnour's remarks appear to be ratcheting up the rhetoric ahead of the next round of talks between Iran and the West later this month over Iran's controversial uranium enrichment program.

The U.S. and Israel have accused Iran of seeking nuclear weapons but Iran denies the charge, saying its nuclear program is geared toward generating power, not a bomb. Israel has said it favors a diplomatic solution to the nuclear standoff but has not ruled out a military strike over fears that Iran may develop nuclear weapons.

Israel maintains a doctrine of ''nuclear ambiguity'' and has never confirmed nor denied having its own nuclear weapons program. It considers Iran a serious threat not only because of Tehran's nuclear program but also because of Iran's arsenal of long-range missiles, which can be fitted with nuclear warheads and are capable of striking the Jewish state.

Tehran is equipped with Shahab-3 missiles which have a range of up to 1,250 miles (2,000 kilometers). Israel is about 625 miles (1,000 kilometers) west of Iran.

Iran's missile program and its nuclear work -- much of it carried out in secrecy -- have long been a concern for the West, which fears Tehran is intent on developing an atomic weapons capability and the missiles to deploy such warheads.

In September, the revelation of a secret uranium enrichment facility near the Iranian holy city of Qom, represented a coup for Western intelligence and put Iran on defense. Within days of intense diplomatic activity, Tehran entered landmark nuclear negotiations with the U.S. and other world powers -- talks that have since somewhat eased tensions between the two sides.

Oct. 25 has been set as a date for an inspection of the Qom site by the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency. Separately, a meeting is slated for Oct. 19 in Vienna with Iran, the U.S., France and Russia to discuss details of a deal that would lead to more cooperation from Iran on the enrichment process.
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If the World Won’t Stop Iran’s Genocide, Israel Must

Louis René Beres - Oct 08, 2009
U.S. News & World Report

The International Atomic Energy Agency is not especially worried about Iran’s newly discovered uranium enrichment operation, and plans to inspect this once secret facility near Qom on October 25. No matter what this inspection reveals, however, sanctions will never be able to protect Israel from a nuclearizing Iran. The Iranian president’s frequent and unhidden threats express a clear declaration of intent to commit genocide. Such intent is actually criminalized by binding international law.

Though supported by law, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu understands that the pre-emptive destruction of Iran’s growing nuclear infrastructures would involve substantial difficulties. True, Israel has now deployed a system of ballistic missile defense, but even this superb system could not adequately protect Israel’s civilians from a nuclear attack.

Even a single nuclear missile that manages to penetrate Israeli defenses could kill very large numbers. In addition, Iran could decide to share its nuclear assets with certain terror groups in the region, with enemies of Israel that could use automobiles and ships rather than missiles as launchers. These groups might also seek "soft" targets in selected American or European cities, such as schools, universities, hospitals, hotels, sports stadiums, etc.

While the IAEA fiddles, Iran continues to augment its incendiary intent toward Israel with a corresponding military capacity. Left to violate Non-Proliferation Treaty rules with effective impunity, Iran’s president and his clerical masters might even be undeterred by any threats of retaliation. Such a possible failure of nuclear deterrence could be the result of a presumed lack of threat credibility, or perhaps of a genuine Iranian disregard for all expected harms. In the worst-case scenario, Iran, animated by specifically Shiite visions of "apocalypse," could become the individual suicide bomber writ large.

If Iran does become fully nuclear, Israel may then have to reassess its stance on nuclear ambiguity, and related policies of nuclear targeting. These urgent issues were openly discussed in the Project Daniel final report, first delivered by hand to then-Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon on Jan. 16, 2003. Originally confidential, the report, titled Israel’s Strategic Future, was the carefully informed product of a small group of senior American and Israeli figures drawn from the academic, military, and intelligence communities. Our major recommendation was that under no circumstances should Iran be allowed to "go nuclear."

In the end, Israel’s security from Iranian attacks of mass destruction will depend considerably upon its selected targets, and on the precise extent to which these targets have been previously identified. It is not enough that Israel simply has "The Bomb." Rather, the adequacy of Israel’s nuclear deterrence and pre-emption policies will depend largely upon the presumed destructiveness of these nuclear weapons, and on where these weapons are thought to be directed.

A nuclear war in the Middle East is not out of the question. Israel will need to choose wisely between "assured destruction" strategies and "nuclear war-fighting" strategies. Assured destruction strategies are sometimes called "countervalue" strategies or "mutual assured destruction." These are strategies of deterrence in which a country primarily targets its strategic weapons on the other side’s civilian populations, and/or on its civilian infrastructures.

Nuclear war-fighting strategies are called "counterforce" strategies. These are systems of deterrence wherein a country primarily targets its strategic nuclear weapons on the other side’s major weapon systems, and on that state’s supporting military assets.

There are serious survival consequences for choosing one strategy over the other. Israel could also opt for some sort of "mixed" strategy. But, for Israel, any policy that might encourage nuclear war fighting should be rejected.

Israel, reasoned Project Daniel, should opt for nuclear deterrence based upon assured destruction. A counterforce targeting doctrine would be less persuasive as a nuclear deterrent, especially to states whose leaders could willingly sacrifice entire armies as "martyrs." If Israel were to opt for nuclear deterrence based upon counterforce capabilities, its enemies might also feel especially threatened. This condition could then actually enlarge the prospect of a nuclear aggression against Israel, and of a follow-on nuclear exchange.

Israel’s decisions on countervalue versus counterforce doctrines will depend, in part, on prior investigations of enemy country inclinations to strike first, and on enemy country inclinations to strike all-at-once. Should Israeli strategic planners assume that an enemy state in process of "going nuclear" is apt to strike first and to strike with all of its nuclear weapons right away, Israeli counterforce-targeted warheads, used in retaliation, would hit only empty launchers. In such circumstances, Israel’s only application of counterforce doctrine would be to strike first itself, an option that Israel completely rejects. From the standpoint of intra-war deterrence, a countervalue strategy would prove more appropriate to a prompt peace.

Should Israeli planners assume that an enemy country "going nuclear" is apt to strike first, and to hold some measure of nuclear firepower in reserve, Israeli counterforce-targeted warheads could elicit damage-limiting benefits. Here, counterforce operations could appear to serve both an Israeli non-nuclear pre-emption, or, should Israel decide not to pre-empt, an Israeli retaliatory strike. Still, the benefits to Israel of maintaining any counterforce targeting options are outweighed by the expected costs.

Regarding Iran, Israel’s best course may still be to seize the conventional pre-emption option. Israel should reject any counterforce targeting doctrine. But if Iran is allowed to continue with its illegal nuclear weapons development, Netanyahu’s immediate response should be to end Israel’s controversial policy of nuclear ambiguity.

Notwithstanding IAEA assurances, the world has turned a blind eye to Iran’s expressly genocidal intent toward Israel, and to Iran’s nuclearization. There is no good reason to believe that Tehran would ever stop its plan for nuclear weapons solely because of assorted economic punishments. To Iran, both the U.N. and the U.S. should now finally understand, sanctions represent only a fly on the elephant’s back.

No country can be required to become complicit in its own annihilation. Without a prompt change in the "civilized world’s" appeasing attitude toward Iran, a law-enforcing expression of anticipatory self-defense may still offer Israel its only remaining survival option.

Louis René Beres is a professor of political science at Purdue University and the author of many books and articles dealing with international law, strategic theory, Israeli nuclear policy, and regional nuclear war. In Israel, he served as chair of Project Daniel